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AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF JUSTICE SCALIA'S
COMMITMENT TO THE RULE OF LAW
GARY LAWSON
On January 13, 2001, barely one month after the Supreme Court's
decision in Bush v. Gore, a group of 554 legal academics calling
themselves "Law Professors for the Rule of Law" took out a full-page
ad in the New York Times that essentially accused the Court's
majority of being faithless to the rule of law. In full, the advertisement
read:
BY STOPPING THE VOTE COUNT IN FLORIDA, THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT USED ITS POWER To ACT AS POLITICAL PARTISANS, NOT
JUDGES OF A COURT OF LAW
We are Professors of Law at 120 American law schools, from
every part of our country, of different political beliefs. But we all
agree that when a bare majority of the U.S. Supreme Court halted
the recount of ballots under Florida law, the five justices were
acting as political proponents for candidate Bush, not as judges.
IT is NOT THE JOB OF A FEDERAL COURT TO STOP VOTES FROM
BEING COUNTED
By stopping the recount in the middle, the five justices acted to
suppress the facts. Justice Scalia argued that the justices had to
interfere even before the Supreme Court heard the Bush team's
arguments because the recount might "cast a cloud upon what
[Bush] claims to be the legitimacy of his election." In other words,
the conservative justices moved to avoid the "threat" that
Americans might learn that in the recount, Gore got more votes
than Bush. This is presumably "irreparable" harm because if the
recount proceeded and the truth once became known, it would
never again be possible to completely obscure the facts. But it is
not the job of the courts to polish the image of legitimacy of the
* Professor, Boston University School of Law. Lest there be any misunderstanding, this
essay is not a broad-based attack on the Law Professors for the Rule of Law, either
individually or collectively. As for Peggy Radin: in view of her April 23, 2001 letter to the
editor of the New York Times, see infra note 6 and accompanying text, I can only say, in
the immortal words of Bugs Bunny, "Of course, you know this means war."
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (granting certiorari and staying the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court).
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Bush presidency by preventing disturbing facts from being
confirmed. Suppressing the facts to make the Bush government
seem more legitimate is the job of propagandists, not judges.
BY TAKING POWER FROM THE VOTERS, THE SUPREME COURT HAS
TARNISHED ITS OWN LEGITIMACY. AS TEACHERS WHOSE LIVIES
HAVE BEEN DEDICATED TO THE RULE OF LAW, WE PROTEST.
The advertisement Singled out Justice Scalia by name for specific
condemnation
The charge of faithlessness to the rule of law leveled by the Law
Professors for the Rule of Law was made in the context of a single
case. An assessment of the charge in that context would require a
detailed discussion of Bush v. Gore, and that is not my project here.
Instead, I use the allegations of the Law Professors for the Rule of
Law as an opportunity to take a broader view of Justice Scalia's
nearly two decades on the Supreme Court. Specifically, I propose an
empirical test of Justice Scalia's commitment to the rule of law
measured over the course of his career. Of course, someone who is
generally committed to the rule of law could lapse from the path in
particular cases, and someone who is generally unconcerned about the
rule of law might hew to it, either deliberately or accidentally, on
some occasions. My focus is on Justice Scalia's general commitment
to the rule of law, not to whether any such commitment was
instantiated in Bush v. Gore.
The threshold problem with such an inquiry is that the charge, as it
appears in the January 13, 2001 advertisement, is too vague to admit
as either proof or disproof. The phrase "the rule of law" is one of the
most contested concepts in the legal lexicon; there is serious question•. 3
whether the term even admits of a verbal definition. Indeed, in 1989,
Justice Scalia wrote a short article about his philosophy of judging
entitled The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, which never defined,
either directly or indirectly, what Justice Scalia meant by the rule of
law. Accordingly, the 554 signers of the advertisement5 may each
have had a different conception of "the rule of law" in mind when
they accused Justice Scalia of disregarding it.
2. N.Y.TIMES, 554 Law Professors Say, January 13, 2001, at A7.
3. See Gary Lawson, A Farewell to Principles, 82 IOWA L. REV. 893, 900-01 (1997);
Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Introduction: Prospects for the Rule of Law, 21
CUMB. L. REV. 427, 428-29 (1991).
4. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
5. As of April 8, 2002, according to the website at www.the-rule-of-law.com, the
number of signatories had risen to 673 members at 137 schools. 673 Law Professors Say,
at http://www.the-rule-of-law.com (last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
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At least one member of the Law Professors for the Rule of Law,
however, has specified a conception of the rule of law that permits
empirical investigation. Professor Margaret Jane Radin was one of the
original signatories to the January 13, 2001 statement. An April 23,
2001 letter to the editor of the New York Times identifies her (along
with the letter's co-author, Mitchell Zimmerman) as one of the
"coordinators of Law Professors for the Rule of Law.",6 The text of
that letter, which was addressed to the very different subject of the
influence of the Federalist Society, is included here for the sake of
completeness:
Once upon a time, judges were not political animals who thought
first about how to advance their political views, and people who
came before them expected evenhanded justice ("A Conservative
Legal Group Thrives in Bush's Washington," front page, April 18).
After a decades-long effort to shape the judiciary to suit the
conservative creed, however, we see judges like those involved
with the Federalist Society who openly embrace a political agenda.
You quote a "prominent appeals court judge" who insists on
anonymity but shamelessly admits that he is not inclined to hire
law clerks who don't pass his tests of right-wing political
correctness. It is in fact notorious among law students that the
Republican judges who dominate the bench apply such political
tests, and this - as well as corporate financing - explains much of
the "success" of the Federalist Society in our law schools. One is
reminded of the days when ambitious students in the former Soviet
Union felt tlt they had to join the Communist Party to advance
their careers.
Professor Radin further detailed her formative role in the Law
Professors for the Rule of Law in an essay published in 2002. 8
There is, of course, no reason to suppose that Professor Radin's
views on the rule of law track those of any other member of the Law
Professors for the Rule of Law, so this article can only test Justice
Scalia's commitment to the rule of law by reference to the conception
set forth by Professor Radin. Indeed, one purpose of this article is to
6. Margaret Jane Radin & Mitchell Zimmerman, Political Tests From the Bench, N.Y.
TIMES, April 23, 2001, at A14.
7. Id.
8. Margaret Jane Radin, Can the Rule of Law Survive Bush v. Gore?, in BUSH v. GORE:
THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 110, 112 (Bruce Ackerman, ed. 2002). A perspicacious
reader may observe that it was therefore unnecessary to use the April 23, 2001 letter to
identify Professor Radin's role in the Law Professors for the Rule of Law. If the reader is
truly perspicacious, however, he or she will also recall the reference to Bugs Bunny in this
article's star footnote.
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encourage other signatories to the January 13, 2001 advertisement to
articulate a conception of the rule of law that permits broader testing.
With respect to Professor Radin's position, however, the results are
quite definitive: Professor Radin is plainly correct that Justice Scalia
has been a clear and determined enemy of the rule of law throughout
his judicial career.
In 1989, Professor Radin wrote an article entitled Reconsidering9
the Rule of Law, which contrasted Professor Radin's conception of
the rule of law with what she called "the traditional ideal of the Rule
of Law," which holds that:
(1) law consists of rules; (2) rules are prior to particular cases,
more general than particular cases, and applied to particular cases;
(3) law is instrumental (the rules are applied to achieve ends); (4)
there is a radical separation between government and citizens
(there are rule-givers and appliers, versus rule-takers and
compliers); (5)16he person is a rational chooser ordering her affairs
instrumentally.
This "traditional ideal" probably corresponds reasonably well to the
conception of the rule of law implicitly held by Justice Scalia.
Professor Radin's article, however, expressly rejected this conception
in favor of a reinterpretation of the rule of law along the following
lines:
A pragmatic reinterpretation of the Rule of Law ... would deny
that law consists quintessentially of rules at all, as well as the
notion that rules are separate from cases and logically pre-exist
their application. Such a reinterpretation would also deny the strict
division of people into rule-givers and rule-followers, anA the
conception of judges as rule-appliers rather than rule-makers.
This reinterpretation leads to an identifiable conception of judicial
fidelity to the rule of law. Professor Radin explains:
Independence and impartiality are traditional aspects of the judge's
role as a functionary separate from the legislative power; these
elements of the Rule of Law are supposed to ensure that judges
stay within their task of rule-applying. But independence and
impartiality can refer to moral autonomy and a commitment to
judgment in light of one's own moral understanding of the nature
of community-not just to formal separation from the interests of
the legislature or the litigants. ...
9. Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781 (1989).
10. Id. at 783, 792.
12. Id. at 814.
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In such an anti-formalist view of the judge's role, judges are an
interpretive community conscious of their obligation to act as
independent moral choosers for thegood of a society, in light of
what that society is and can become.
This reconstruction of the rule of law also has direct implications
for constitutionalism:
In the pragmatic normative understanding, our constitution is not
merely a document but rather that which "constitutes" us as a
political community .... In this pragmatic view of politics, we are
always attempting to accomplish a transition from today's nonideal
world to the better world of our vision, and it is a transition that
never ends. Moreover, our visions and our nonideal reality
paradoxically constitute each other: what we can formulate as
being better depends upon where we are now, and the way we
understan 4 where we are now depends upon our vision of what
should be.
It is obvious even on casual observation that Justice Scalia fails to
live up to this rule-of-law ideal. Even his most ardent defenders must
admit that Justice Scalia is notoriously unwilling to exercise "moral
autonomy and a commitment to judgment in light of one's own moral
understanding of the nature of community." He is starkly remiss in his
obligation to embrace a role as an "independent moral chooser[] for
the good of a society, in light of what that society is and can become."
And as for making "our visions and our nonideal reality paradoxically
constitute each other"-well, one has to wonder how he got past the
ABA screeners on that one.
These intuitive observations are confirmed by more precise
empirical tests. Professor Radin's account of the rule of law is driven
by two major influences. The first is a conception of rules drawn from'5
the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and specifically a rule-skeptical
interpretation of Wittgenstein16 made famous by Saul Kripke in his
13. Id. at 817.
14. Id. at 816.
15. Id. at 797:
A Wittgensteinian view of words, and of the rules containing them,
suggests that there is no such thing as traditional formal realizability,
or in other words, that the traditional formalist conception of rules is
wrong. The Wittgensteinian view of rules may be characterized as
both a social and a practice conception. It is a social conception
because in this view rules depend essentially on social context, and it
is a practice conception because rules also depend essentially on
reiterated human activity.
16. Radin, supra note 9, at 797-99.
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classic work Witigenstein on Rules and Private Language." Indeed,
Professor Radin's article uses the word "Wittgenstein" or
"Wittgensteinian" ninety-six times (11 1 times if one counts "id."
citations to Wittgenstein). She also cites Kripke and Richard Rorty,
another philosopher loosely in the Wittgensteinian tradition, eight
times each. Her second major influence is the work of Robert Cover,'
8
who is mentioned sixteen times (eighteen if one adds in two "id."
citations).
We can now empirically evaluate Justice Scalia's commitment to
the rule of law using basic WESTLAW search techniques involving
"OPINIONBY(Scalia)" and various concepts keyed to the rule of law.
The results are consistent and revealing:
References to Wittgenstein: 0.
References to "Wittgensteinian": 0
References to Richard Rorty: 0.
References to Saul Kripke: 0.
This last result is particularly remarkable; even I have cited Saul
Kripke.
19
Professor Radin's more recent essay on Bush v. Gore suggests
material for a broader search. That essay emphasizes that the
assumptions underlying the so-called "traditional ideal" of the rule of
law "are part of a worldview that has been undercut by thinkers from
Kant to Habermas." 20 A search for "OPINIONBY (Scalia) &
Habermas" generated no matches. However, research reveals that
Justice Scalia has relied upon Immanuel Kant! In Morgan v. Illinois,
the Court held that jurors who would always impose the death penalty
for capital murder could not, as a matter of constitutional law, be• . 21
considered impartial. Justice Scalia, in dissent, objected that under
this holding, "[t]hose who agree with the author of Exodus, or with
Immanuel Kant, must be banished from American juries ... because
they do not share the strong penological preferences of this Court."
22
17. SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982).
18. See Radin, supra note 9, at 814-15.
19. See Lawson, supra note 3, at 896-97. Of course, I have also cited Bullwinkle, see
Gary Lawson & Tamara Mattison, A Tale of Two Professions: The Third-Party Liability of
Accountants and Attorneys for Negligent Misrepresentation, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1309, 1311
n. I (1991), but never mind.
20. Radin, supra note 8, at 124.
21. 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
22. Id. at 752 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
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Whether invoking Kant in support of capital punishment counts as
letting "our visions and our nonideal reality paradoxically constitute
each other" is left to the reader.
Obviously, one cannot check for references to every thinker after
Kant and before Habermas without reading all of Justice Scalia's
opinions in full, but in order to assure that my test was not overly
narrow, I also conducted some further random searches.
"OPINIONBY(Scalia) & Merleu-Ponty" yielded no hits.
"OPINIONBY(Scalia) & Heidegger or Husserl or Camus" yielded no
hits. In fact, I have not found a single case in which Justice Scalia has
ever relied on the work of a modem philosopher in the
Wittgensteinian, existentialist, or post-structuralist tradition!
Further inquiry confirms these stark results. "OPINIONBY(Scalia)
& Cover" turns up sixty-one hits, some with multiple references, but
not one of those references was to the work of Robert Cover. And,
most tellingly of all, Justice Scalia has never cited Margaret Jane
Radin, even though she was once cited by an opinion that dissented
23
from a majority decision authored by Justice Scalia.
Those persons who have regarded Justice Scalia as an exemplar of
the rule of law need to take account of these findings. I hope that this
article will spur further empirical work along these lines. As for
Professor Radin: I'm sure that she will be eager to pass these results
along to the Senate Judiciary Committee for appropriate hearings-
unless, of course, she feels a stifling chill from the Federalist Society
and its corporate sponsors.
LAW 198 (W. Hastie. trans., 1887) (1796)).
23. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 392 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing
Margaret Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cnel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 1036 (1978)).

